本刊網站獲2026年「國科會人文社會科學研究中心」補助
Norway-Russia Relations: Continuity and Change of Deterrence and Reassurance
Tse-Kang Leng and Zhu-Cheng Zhao
Video Content Presented by Prof. Tse-Kang Leng
Why focus on Nordic-Russia relations (especially Norway)?
I think everyone knows that the Arctic has become a very hot topic recently, with plenty of different views on it. We also have seen President Trump raise certain views on issues such as Greenland. At the same time, we all know that Russia is the most important state in the Arctic. So, what views does Russia have, after the war in Ukraine, on Arctic-related affairs? Another point is that Taiwan has long had limited understanding of the Nordic countries. We may even think that all Nordic countries are more or less the same. But actually, those Nordic countries are quite different. I remember that several years ago, when people talked about Finland, like when we talked about Finlandization, Norway seems to be always out of our sight, as we had not thought of other issues.
Accordingly, Professor Zhu-Cheng Zhao, my co-author on this article, and I began thinking that the relationship between Norway and Russia would be a very special one. What we are now seeing is that the Nordic countries are the smaller side, while Russia is the larger side. What impact will this asymmetrical relationship have under the framework of Arctic governance? What kind of impact will it have? How can this asymmetrical relationship offer entry points in theory or policy? And at the same time help us understand how the Nordic countries as smaller states, for example, Norway as a small state, can, amid the constantly changing overall international environment, find room for survival and development? This was the idea the two of us had.
We then divided the work between us. Professor Zhao looked at the issue from the Russian perspective, while I looked at it from the Norwegian perspective. We then compared the differences in perception between the two sides. We also looked at what kinds of complications might arise between domestic politics and external relations. Beyond that, we asked whether the survival strategies of small states could be further generalized and applied to other international cases in which small states face asymmetrical relations with major powers. This is what we thought about during the early stages of our research.
What are the main findings? What does the “deterrence and reassurance strategy” mean?
Let’s see the overall background. Russia itself is the largest state in the Arctic. To a certain extent, Russia sees the Arctic Ocean as its inland sea. After the Cold War, however, European countries and Russia basically coexisted within a framework of peaceful relations for many years. Since 2000, a number of new institutional arrangements have emerged, with Russia involved in. For example, the Arctic Council included not only the Arctic Eight, but later on many observers, including the ones from East Asian countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and others, seemed to have formed a new and more complete framework for Arctic governance.
If we look at Russia's security considerations through the bilateral relationship between Russia and Norway, the truth is that Russia's focus is not actually directed at Norway. What Russia is most concerned about is NATO. So when Russia looks at the Arctic issues, it sees them as issues between Russia and NATO. This is why, as I said at the beginning, besides looking at Russia from Norway's perspective, we must first look at Norway from Russia's perspective. So for Russia, their main focus in looking at Norway is the NATO behind it. So NATO, as a very important multilateral organization, coexists with what we just mentioned, namely many Arctic governance mechanisms. But the Arctic Council, such governance mechanism itself excludes security issues. NATO, by contrast, is purely about security. The two exist in parallel.
But from Norway's perspective, being the smaller side, it cannot rely only on NATO, nor can it deal with such a large opposing state solely through confrontation. It has to adopt a relatively balanced policy. Since the Cold War, Norway has developed a policy of “Deterrence and Reassurance”. This is a policy that has been maintained since the Cold War. Ever since that time, Norway and Russia have basically been in a rather peaceful relation. In fact, even if we were to look a little further back in time, since the nineteenth century, the border between Norway and Russia has not changed.
Yet from a purely security-oriented perspective, among the Nordic countries, Norway is in a very dangerous position. The main reason is that Norway borders Russia both at sea and on land, and the headquarters of Russia's Northern Fleet is right next door, including nuclear weapons and other capabilities. So Norway has to handle these issues very, very carefully. From Norway's perspective, reassurance and deterrence must be implemented at the same time. If there is only reassurance without deterrence, it becomes something like appeasement. If there is only deterrence without reassurance, it becomes a purely confrontational policy. The question is how to combine the two. Over time, Norway gradually developed a set of operating mechanisms.
For instance, how does reassurance work together with deterrence? Well, several key points are involved. First, crises must be handled properly. Between states, no matter how friendly you are to other states, there will always be different types of crises that may arise. The second is what we call “Calibrated Deterrence”. It does not pursue deterrence across the board. Instead, it focuses on specific issues, with NATO standing behind it. However, it also assures Russia that it imposes certain limits on itself. The purpose of these self-imposed limits is peace, not submission or appeasement. But within the overall framework, the most important point is that Norway faces what is known as a security dilemma. To resolve this, just as with the prisoner’s dilemma, you must have communication channels. Norway's focus is therefore how to keep communication channels open within this operating process. At the same time, Norway and Russia both need a shared understanding that the two countries are status quo powers, not states seeking to overturn the situation. Only under these foundations, and this concept, can there be a complete policy that promotes both deterrence and reassurance at the same time.
Another point is that Norway, as the smaller side, is in fact more vulnerable. It must make sure that correct assessments are made in two aspects. The first is how to accurately assess the intentions and capabilities of the opposing state. In this case, its main opposing state of course is Russia. The second is how to make its own capabilities more robust and effective. Deterrence and reassurance do not mean completely giving up military development. Norway must have a very comprehensive mechanism of cooperation with NATO, while also imposing certain self-limitations in specific contexts. So this is a full operating mechanism and a complete framework in which deterrence and reassurance function together. Historically, the past five or six decades have shown that this mechanism has basically operated smoothly. Of course, after the war in Ukraine, it has encountered new challenges.
Has the situation changed since the Russia-Ukraine War?
After the war in Ukraine, this issue can be examined from two dimensions. Let us first look at it from Russia's side. In recent years, the most striking development has been Russia's strategy and related principles for the use of nuclear weapons, which have begun to change. Russia has also begun to change the overall priorities in its foreign policy. In its latest foreign policy outlines and nuclear-use principles, two features are especially worth noting. First, Russia has placed its neighboring countries and the Arctic among its top foreign policy priorities. This makes us think about Arctic security differently. In the past, everyone felt things were peaceful and uneventful. Now Arctic security has become a very important issue. Second, in terms of its overall nuclear-use policy, Russia has begun to include non-nuclear-weapon states that maintain close relations with states hostile to Russia as possible targets for nuclear weapons. This makes the overall level of danger much higher. That is one side of Russia.
On Norway's side, the most obvious is that the war in Ukraine has changed the entire security posture in the Arctic region. This security posture can be viewed from several angles. First, can Norway's original principle of self-imposed limits continue to exist? This includes questions such as whether the U. S. military can have more bases on Norwegian territory. Second, should Norway strengthen its defense budget and defense capabilities? What we see now is that new agreements between Norway and the United States allow the U.S. to use more Norwegian military bases. At the same time, Norway's defense budget has exceeded the level of two percent of GDP. This marks a major break from the past, and these new measures also enjoy very strong cross-party support at home. This shows that within Norway's political structure, there is a consensus on strengthening military power.
But the question now is how far Norway can go. On this point, I think our research findings show that the principles of deterrence and reassurance still continue to exist. Even in the cooperation agreement Norway signed with the United States, the principles of deterrence and reassurance are built into it. Also, Norway will draw a restricted flight zone, which is extremely sensitive because it lies very close to Russia's Northern Fleet headquarters. If combat aircraft were to fly over this restricted zone, that would itself be provocative to a certain degree. So on this point, Norway still maintains its original policy of self-imposed limits. However, these things are becoming very difficult to sustain, mainly because Finland and Sweden have both become NATO members. As a result, the use and overflight of military aircraft, including reconnaissance aircraft, creates gray areas and ambiguity. This is also one of the key points raised at the beginning in the discussion of deterrence and reassurance: That is how to manage crises. The main precondition for crisis management is that communication channels must already exist. Only with such channels can a state have the ability to handle crises.
Another point is that, Ukraine, after the war, their concerns about Russian military expansion can be seen in two places. One is the line between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, the line called GIUK Gap. This line blocks Russia's Northern Fleet as well as military forces from the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea from further entering the Atlantic. It is a very important defense line. Norway also plays a very important role here. It must strengthen related military measures. Another point concerns Svalbard, the largest archipelago inside the Arctic Circle. This archipelago is a very, very special case because, under international law, the sovereignty over the archipelago belongs to Norway. However, under an international treaty concluded after the First World War in the 1920s, the treaty parties themselves, the parties to the Svalbard Treaty, enjoy equal rights to development and economic activity there. Regarding this, Russia has been extremely active in this area.
After the war in Ukraine, Russia identified several special locations where it wants to further develop mining, and it has even turned some abandoned mines into tourist destinations. Russia has also gone further and argued that there should be more scientific research units and greater research capacities on Svalbard. This point actually conflicts somewhat with Norway's principles. For example, in scientific research, Norway's principle is that other countries may come here to set up research stations, but Norway is the host. They cannot set up research stations on their own. All the activities that you do must have Norway serving as the main coordinator. Russia has challenged this point. Therefore, on Svalbard, some very sensitive issues may emerge. But in terms of self-imposed limits or reassurance, Norway basically still follows its existing principles. For example, can U.S. military aircraft take off from or land on this island? Norway's principle is that they cannot. This is because the archipelago cannot be militarized. Although the area is jointly developed, keeping it non-militarized is a very important line. So Norway is basically still making adjustments along its original line, while also adapting to new circumstances. It has not completely abandoned that position.
But if we look at the overall picture, after the war in Ukraine, have many new military conflicts actually emerged in the Arctic? Actually, no. Basically, all countries are still working to maintain the status quo in the Arctic. But as a small state, Norway has put a great deal of effort into trying to maintain the status quo. So, the two real principles of deterrence and reassurance are: First, maintaining communication and, second, hoping to preserve the status quo. If a small state can maintain the status quo, has the backing of NATO, and possesses its own capabilities to communicate with the opponent, if these three elements can be brought together, then Norway can maintain its continuity, survival, and further development.
Can the “deterrence and reassurance strategy” continue after the Russia-Ukraine War?
Looking at the Norwegian case, I think deterrence and reassurance are two sides of the same coin. It cannot rely only on deterrence, and it is impossible to rely only on reassurance. Given Norway's special geographic conditions, it actually faces a very, very great threat. It therefore has to maintain a basic, minimum level of communication channels. Without those channels, then the entire mechanism cannot operate further. These communication channels are also accompanied by self-imposed limits. Only with self-imposed limits is trust-building possible. If Norway were to lean heavily toward one major power, and place no limits on its military posture, then those channels would not emerge, nor would mutual trust emerge. So self-imposed limits are necessary. Self-imposed limits may look like a loss of sovereignty, but it is not. Self-imposed limits allow the entire mechanism to operate more smoothly. Together with self-imposed limits, trust can be built, and communication channels can be established, even as the smaller side. Of course, one special point about Norway is aside from having a major power behind it, more importantly, it has the backing of NATO. NATO is a multilateral security mechanism, which means Norway has various institutionalized, multilateral mechanisms at work. Only under this broader framework can Norway operate deterrence and reassurance and only then can self-imposed limits avoid becoming surrender. Otherwise, self-imposed limits by a small state are essentially surrender.
Another issue is, within the range of what is possible, how to properly combine domestic politics and external relations. Any kind of external relationship must be supported by domestic public opinion. What we see now is that although Norwegian people’s negative feelings toward Russia have increased after the war broke out in Ukraine, the public opinion has not turned Russia into a country with which Norway must completely break off relations. This also involves one of the traditions in Norway's foreign policy: Norway does not like great-power politics. It hopes to use the niche of a small state to facilitate and to promote better governance across the region and the world. So Norwegian public opinion leans toward seeing European countries and EU countries as Norway's true partners. As for major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, Norwegians basically do not regard them as their main partners. So against this broader backdrop of public opinion, Norway has developed this particular orientation. But not liking a country does not mean that one cannot deal with it. This is what we mean by pragmatism. In Norway's foreign policy, then, a small state has to be pragmatic.
Can the Norwegian experience be applied to other regions?
From the Norwegian case, we can see that deterrence and reassurance are rooted in Norway's particular Nordic environment and its Arctic governance context. They may not be exactly the same elsewhere. So how should we re-operationalize the concept of deterrence and the concept of reassurance? But I think there is one concept that we can in fact compare across cases: That is how to maintain the status quo. Because the status quo is constantly changing, a small state must adopt new policies to adjust to and respond to the status quo, this is the key to the survival of a small state, rather than clinging to the status quo that we had in mind, because the status quo is changing. So from the Norwegian case, we can see that Norway is in fact constantly adjusting. In that process of adjustment, it also tries to respond to domestic politics. I think this point, namely how to combine domestic politics and external relations, will also be a very important dimension for our future comparative research.
Interdisciplinary or cross-national comparative research can help maintain peace. This form of peace isn’t a peace locked in stalemate, but one with prospects for the future. The ultimate purpose of those prospects, in fact, is to resolve many security-dilemma problems. One of the main preconditions for resolving security dilemmas is, of course, how to carry out a process of trust-building. And this process of trust-building must rely on the wisdom of small states. Small states may need wisdom even more than great powers do. Great powers have their own conditions, while small states have their own logic and methods of survival. I think this is something that the theory and policy of Taiwan's external relations will certainly be able to draw some insights from.